

19 May 2026

CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Share Price	\$0.395
Shares on Issue	151.1m
Market Cap	\$59.7m
Cash (31 Mar 2026)	\$8.1m
Enterprise Value	\$51.6m
Performance Rights	14.5M
Options	18.8M

D3E BOARD

Greg Columbus

Non-Executive Chairman

David Casey

Managing Director

Matthew Worner

Non-Executive Director

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS

NOVO Energy	9.10%
Citicorp Noms	6.23%
David Casey (MD/CEO)	5.35%
Holdrey Pty Ltd	5.29%
Matthew Worner (NED)	4.45%
John Zetzman (Tech)	4.18%

GBA CAPITAL CONTACTS

Brandon Loo (Sales)

+61 2 9037 2010

bloo@gbacapital.com.au

Dave Wall (Corporate)

dwall@gbacapital.com.au

www.gbacapital.com.au

ACN 643 039 123

Sales Note

D3 Energy (ASX:D3E | OTCQX:DNRGF)

The Helium Hedge of Hormuz

The helium market broke this year. Iranian strikes on Qatar's Ras Laffan complex in early March took roughly a third of global supply offline overnight and the Strait of Hormuz, through which 1/3 of global helium is transported, has now been closed for almost 3 months. Spot prices have more than quadrupled, Airgas has declared force majeure to US customers, and industry consultants are talking about a multi-year structural deficit even if Hormuz reopens tomorrow. Against that backdrop, D3 Energy holds what looks increasingly like the most strategically valuable junior helium position listed anywhere globally: a Sproule-certified 2C resource of 35.6 BCF of helium (post the May 2026 ER386 upgrade), commercial flow rates already demonstrated at exceptional 4-7% concentrations, and acreage outside the Middle East, Russia and Algeria.

Hormuz – highlights short/long term He issues The dual disruption — physical damage to Ras Laffan could keep ~5% of global supply offline for years, plus a logistics blockade on the rest of Qatar's ~33% share — is unprecedented in helium. Russia has introduced export controls; the US Federal Helium Reserve is already exhausted; Algeria can't fill the gap. Industry analysts at Intelligas have flagged spot prices potentially reaching US\$2,000/mcf if the disruption persists through 2026 — roughly 5x pre-crisis pricing. South Korea and Taiwan, sitting at the front of the queue for semiconductor and AI fab demand, are the most exposed. The Western world has just learned what it means to be short of helium, and the immediate policy and procurement response is the same in every capital: diversify away from the Strait. New, non-Middle-Eastern, non-Russian helium provinces have suddenly become strategic assets — and there aren't many of them.

D3 has what the peer group doesn't Listed helium juniors generally fail one of three tests: resource, flow rate, or jurisdiction. D3 passes all three. On resource, the May 2026 ER386 booking lifted certified 2C helium 65% to 35.6 BCF — comfortably the largest in the listed junior peer group post the RLT takeout. On flow rates, D3 is one of a handful of juniors anywhere with sustained, demonstrated commercial flow at world-class concentrations (4-7%) — most plays globally are sub-1% and still considered commercial. June 2025 re-testing of RBD03 actually showed HIGHER flow rates than the August 2024 test after a 12-month shut-in, consistent with continual recharge at depth — a reservoir characteristic that we haven't seen anywhere else. On jurisdiction, D3's 478,699-acre South African position and 1.45m-acre Arckaringa Basin position in South Australia are both well outside the Hormuz corridor. The combination — size, rate, location — is unique.

Valuation: floor in place, ceiling moved up The January 2026 RLT/ASPI scheme implementation set the comparable: ASP Isotopes acquired Renegen's neighbouring South African helium asset, with ASPI's subsequent market-cap re-rating implying the assets were taken out at a substantial premium to the deal price. D3 now holds a larger 2C helium resource than RLT did at announcement. On any reasonable comp-based valuation, D3 should trade as a multiple of the current ~A\$60m market cap once the Production Right is granted — and we'd argue the Hormuz overlay has materially lifted the ceiling on that comp. Modelling D3's 2P reserves and upgraded 2C resources on conservative pricing assumptions (i.e. ignoring the Hormuz spike entirely) yields 2P NPV10 of ~US\$120m and a 2C scenario well in excess of US\$2.5b. Apply current spot pricing and the numbers get ridiculous.

Catalyst path — short, dense, de-risking Newsflow over the next 12 months is heavy and predominantly de-risking: prospective resource for the drill-ready Hydrohelix prospect in South Australia (PEL 121); JV/farm-in process for PEL 121; Strategic Integrated Project status in South Africa; initial gas sales offtake; reserve upgrades extending beyond the current Production Right footprint (<1% of acreage); Hydrohelix-1 drilling; and ultimately Grant of the Production Right, guided for Q4 2026 / Q1 2027. We expect the pace of re-rate to increase as these are achieved throughout the remainder of the year.

The Thesis Helium has just had its 1973 moment. The market has moved decisively, the policy response is supply diversification, and there are very few credible new sources outside the Strait. D3 has the largest junior 2C helium resource glo, the best demonstrated flow rates and concentrations in the peer group, and a clear M&A precedent (RLT/ASPI) that sets a floor. With \$8.1m of cash, a tight register (NOVO 9.1%, board alignment), and management that has unlocked >A\$1.5b of takeover value across its last three companies, the trade is straightforward.

Unique asset

D3E's asset has a number of unique elements:

- Located in one of the most explored mining areas in South Africa — many legacy exploration boreholes (mainly targeting gold) that have been flowing gas for ~40 years with no noticeable decline
- Methane is biogenic in nature (microbial, not from kerogen cracking), with evidence of continual gas regeneration and recharge at depth
- Very high helium concentrations averaging 4-6% (up to 7% measured at ER315) — most plays globally are sub-1% and still considered commercial
- Gas free-flows to surface unassisted from shallow depths — no pumps, no downhole equipment, no produced water
- June 2025 re-testing of RBD03 showed HIGHER flow rates (~180-200 Mscf/d) than the August 2024 test, after being shut in for 12 months — consistent with continual recharge

The upshot is **ultra low-cost, ultra high-value production**. At US\$10/mcf for methane and US\$400/mcf for helium, a 200 Mscf/d well at 5% helium concentration generates ~US\$2.0m+ in annual wellhead revenue. With well costs of ~US\$200k and no surface equipment required, payback is months not years. Start multiplying out additional wells over a number of years and a multi-billion-dollar NPV10 is achievable.

Reserves & contingent resources (Sproule certified)

Reserves & Resources (BCF)	1P / 1C	2P / 2C	3P / 3C
Gross reserve	7.21	14.43	22.97
Net methane reserve	5.45	10.91	17.36
Net helium reserve	0.353	0.706	1.124
Recoverable gas (contingent)	415.4	808.8	1,506.5
Recoverable methane (contingent)	356.8	690.3	1,279.4
Recoverable helium (contingent)	17.8	35.6	67.9

Note: reserves cover <1% of total acreage under tenure/application. Material upside expected as further area is evaluated.

Helium market backdrop

The ~6.5 BCF/pa global helium market is projected to reach 8+ BCF/pa by 2030 and double by 2035, driven by semiconductor manufacturing, MRI, AI infrastructure cooling and quantum computing. Helium is non-replaceable in many applications and cannot be recycled once vented.

The March 2026 QatarEnergy Ras Laffan Train 6 force majeure has triggered what industry observers describe as up to a 5-year structural supply deficit, with helium spot prices spiking sharply and global semiconductor supply at risk. Russia has separately introduced helium export controls. New helium provinces outside the Middle East, Russia and Algeria are now strategically important — D3 is well placed to fill that gap from both South Africa and South Australia.

12-month catalyst calendar

Date	Event
2H 2026	Prospective Resource for PEL 121 (Hydrohelix)
2H 2026	Strategic Integrated Project (SIP) status (South Africa)
2H 2026	Potential JV partner for PEL 121 & 122 (South Australia)
2H 2026	Gas sales offtake agreement (NOVO Energy)
4Q 2026	Reserve upgrade beyond current PRA footprint
1H 2027	Drilling at Hydrohelix-1
Q4 2026 / Q1 2027	Grant of Production Right

Investment thesis (summary)

D3E has a multi-billion-dollar NPV asset with proven reserves and a substantially upgraded 2C resource base where value will be unlocked via a well-understood (but not easy) process involving grant of a production right. The January 2026 RLT/ASPI transaction provides a clear valuation precedent and floor, with D3 now holding a larger 2C helium resource than RLT did at the time of the deal. The next 12 months should deliver a steady flow of de-risking events — additional reserve upgrades, gas sales offtake, JV/farm-in for South Australia, drilling at Hydrohelix, and ultimately grant of the production right. Combined with a tightening global helium market post the Qatar force majeure, the setup looks attractive.

Corporately, D3 is well funded with \$8.1m cash at 31 March 2026, following the successful \$6.12m placement at \$0.36/share in April 2026. The register is tightly held — NOVO Energy 9.1%, with significant board alignment. Looks ready for the next leg up.

"Sales Note" provides commentary about stocks, themes and investment ideas beyond our formal research coverage. It contains no unpublished Recommendations or Price Targets.

Disclaimer

GBA Capital Pty Ltd (ACN 643 039 123) (“GBA Capital” or “GBA”) is a Corporate Authorised Representative of Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL No. 544680).

GBA believes that any information herein is accurate and reliable, but no warranties of accuracy, reliability or completeness are given (except insofar as liability under any statute cannot be excluded). No responsibility for any errors or omissions or any negligence is accepted by GBA, its related bodies corporate or any of their respective directors, employees or agents.

GBA Capital and its officers, employees, advisers and agents advise that they and persons associated with them may hold or otherwise have an interest in securities of the Company and that they may earn brokerage, commissions, fees and other benefits and advantages, whether pecuniary or not and whether direct or indirect, in connection with the making of a recommendation for dealing by a client in these securities, and which may reasonably be expected to be capable of having an influence in the making of any recommendation, and that some or all of our representatives could be remunerated wholly or partly by way of commission.

GBA Capital has received assistance from the Company referred to in this Research Report including but not limited to discussions with management of the Company. GBA Capital prohibits Research Analysts sending draft Recommendations, Valuations and Price Targets to subject companies. However, it should be presumed that the Author of the Research Report has had discussions with the subject Company to ensure factual accuracy prior to publication.

Notwithstanding that GBA Capital maintains coverage on, makes recommendations concerning or discusses issuers, it may be periodically restricted from referencing issuers due to legal or policy reasons.